1. Th e statement made by the Supreme Court about a possibility of disclosing the minutes of the examination of a witness residing abroad if he or she fails to appear in the hearing if he or she was previously examined evokes fundamental doubts both about the theses and main argumentation's threads. Th erefore it does require a more profound analysis because the reasoning to the above quoted theses is general, not to say -partially internally contradictory. On the one hand, the Supreme Court indicates that a possibility of free travel in the EU countries means that oft en the only actual impediment of giving evidence by a witness residing abroad before a judge may be a long distance from the place of the witness's residence to the court's build-ing. However, due to the common access to means of communication, such a diffi cult obstacle can be overcome. Indeed it is beyond any doubts, as noticed by the Supreme Court in the reasoning, that in many cases appearance in a court will be less time consuming and burdensome for a witness residing abroad than for a witness living in a remote part of the country. Th is eventually leads the Supreme Court to conclude that residence abroad of a witness should be treated as a suffi cient prerequisite to read aloud his or her testimony given in preparatory proceedings only if his or her examination before a court is impeded to an extent comparable to a lack of possibility to serve him or her summons or other insurmountable obstacles.
On the other hand, the Supreme Court admits in another part of the reasoning to the glossed judgment that envisaging an unconditioned prerequisite of reading aloud a testimony of a witness who resides abroad, the provision of Art. 391 § 1 of the Code of Criminal Procedure does not make the application of this possibility depend on any additional conditions such as, e.g., a long period of residence abroad and the importance of such evidence being read aloud to the pending proceedings, which does not exempt the court from a duty to establish whether the witness's residence abroad is a real impediment to implement the principle of immediacy 2 . Moreover, the Supreme Court adds that the norm contained in the provision of Art. 391 § 1 of the CCP is of an "exceptional nature while the context created by other prerequisites listed therein allowing to read aloud a testimony of an absent witness do not leave any doubts that the witness's residence abroad should be treated as a suffi cient prerequisite to read aloud his or her testimony given in preparatory proceedings only if his or her examination before a court is impeded to an extent comparable to a lack of possibility to serve him or her summons or other insurmountable obstacles".
2. Th e above opinion of the Supreme Court can be approved of solely within the scope of the exceptional nature of the provision of Art. 391 § 1 of the CCP expressing deviation from the rule of immediacy. It elevates a legal norm determining conditions to be fulfi lled to allow disclosure of the minutes of the examination in a hearing if a witness fails to appear in it 3 . One of these conditions is the witness's residence abroad. Th e circumstance is unconditioned, the same as other conditions indicated in Art. 391 § 1 of the CCP allowing to read aloud appropriate fragments of the minutes of testimonies submitted earlier by a witness in preparatory proceedings or before a court in this or another case, or other proceedings envisaged by the Act. Admitting a possibility of reading aloud a witness's testimony both by the court and parties 4 , the legislator failed to specify accurately both a kind of such residence and 2 The same opinion was expressed by the Supreme Court in the ruling of 6 April, 2006, IV KK 7/06. The Court ruled that the very fact of a witness residing abroad for a long time authorizes a court to read aloud his or her testimony regardless of its importance to pending proceedings (OSNKW 2006, No. 6, item 60 . Th e legislator implies that a possibility of reading aloud the minutes of the witness's testimony does not depend on "any additional conditions such as, e.g., a long residence abroad or the importance of such evidence being read aloud to the pending proceedings", which has also been approved of by the Supreme Court in the glossed judgment. It expresses the Supreme Court's reference merely to the rules of language interpretation and the conviction that the application of these rules eliminates the very admissibility of pursuing the interpretation with the use of still other methods. Nevertheless, it should be noticed that even an obvious eff ect of the language interpretation does not exempt the interpreter from a duty to refer to systemic and functional interpretation in order to explore whether the result of the language interpretation is not irrational or axiologically unacceptable. Th us the doctrine and Supreme Court's case law rightly more and more oft en indicate that relying only on the language interpretation as the only method of interpretation is not suffi cient and may lead to the incomplete reading of a legal norm. Th erefore it is postulated not to fi nish the process of interpretation at this stage but verify the obtained results with the use of further interpretation directives (systemic and functional) regardless of a degree of the language unambiguity 6 . Hence you do not need to be too penetrative to claim that in such a situation the result of a legal interpretation performed through the prism of many interpretative directives provides greater opportunities for obtaining a correct result of this process than limiting oneself to one method of interpretation.
Moving on the subject matter of the glossed judgment of the Supreme Court and considering the above, it is necessary to refer to extra-linguistic directives of interthe reading of Art. 167 of the CCP, it should be assumed that the minutes may be read aloud by the court or parties. It should be added that reading aloud the minutes of a witness hearing by the party requires a prior motion for evidence and admitting it under Art. 368 of the CCP. 5
The CCP of 1969 used an analogous expression in Art. 337 § 1 thereof. It was justifi ed by the need to replace a prerequisite admitting reading aloud a testimony "due to a considerable distance of the place of residence", which was fi rst occurred in Art. pretation. In the pursuit of the above, it should be pointed out that the provision of Art. 391 § 1 of the CCP functions as an exception from the rule of immediacy to take evidence in criminal proceedings, which is commonly binding in the Polish procedure; and the same as every exception, it should be applied moderately. We should remember that despite numerous exceptions, the contemporary model of criminal proceedings is based on the rule of immediacy to take evidence proving the defendant's responsibility directly by a competent court. Two directives ensure from the rule of immediacy, i.e., the procedural body and parties should have a direct contact with the source of evidence and evidence, and the procedural body should establish facts most of all by means of original evidence 7 . Nevertheless, there are opinions enriching the content of the rule of immediacy by another directive according to which the court should rely solely on evidence taken during a hearing 8 . Anyway, leaving disputes on the content of the rule of immediacy aside, it should be underlined that a signifi cant guarantee ensuing from the rule of immediacy is the necessity of a direct contact of the court with the evidence being taken, which allows members of the bench gather impressions necessary to assess this evidence properly. Th e thing is judges should be fully aware of the entire evidence used as the basis of sentencing in order to guarantee judgments actually based on the evidence that has been duly and properly verifi ed and assessed by the judges with regard to its credibility and value. A direct contact of the court with evidence sources and a possibility of verifying its content during a trial does allow the court to fully evaluate evidence. What is more, later on, it signifi cantly aff ects the accuracy of the assessed credibility of evidence and its importance with regard to the case's resolution; and in consequence, implementation of the principle of the search for the truth.
Although the addressee of the rule of immediacy is, above all, the fi rst-instance court as this court establishes facts which are the substantial basis of a ruling on the matter of litigation, this rule applies to all procedural bodies and litigants
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. With regard to the parties, taking evidence directly in a hearing should fully implement the right to defence and the rule of adversarial proceedings by the active participation 7
The same, e.g.: S. Waltoś, P. Hofmański, Proces karny. Zarys systemu, Warszawa 2016, p. 269. 8 D. Świecki, inter alia, supports the above opinion claiming that "to apply this rule properly, sentencing forum is also important because apart from a main hearing, the court may also take evidence elsewhere. Yet only in a hearing the court has the best conditions to evaluate evidence properly. It ensues from the fact that the court must disclose evidence in a hearing. This way the legislator ensures the court has a direct contact with evidence. The same, the fi rst directive of the rule of immediacy facilitates implementation of the second directive. Thus it is also an important element of the rule of immediacy. Whereas the third directive is the essence of this rule because it creates the best conditions to search the truth" -D. of the parties in hearing of evidence. In consequence, the parties may have a direct access to each piece of evidence and participate actively in hearing evidence during a trial if they are present and express their will to participate actively in hearing evidence before the court. Th us the rule of immediacy guarantees that the court will rely on the evidence obtained and taken in a way allowing full examination of the case, which is also the implementation of the defendant's procedural guarantee. In the light of the above considerations, it cannot be claimed that a legal norm expressed in the provision of Art. 391 § 1 of the CCP allows to read aloud the witnesses' testimony in pending criminal proceedings in every situation of the witnesses' residence abroad regardless of "any additional conditions such as, e.g., a long residence abroad". If it happened, the rationale behind the rule of immediacy would be depreciated while the rule itself would be considerably weakened. Th at is why, bearing in mind the content of the rule of immediacy and being aware of the fact that the norm expressed in Art. 391 § 1 of the CCP is the exception thereto, it should be assumed that the obstacle in the form of the witness's residence abroad may be a prerequisite to read aloud his or her testimony given before by them if this residence is real, persistent or long-lasting and actually prevents the witness's appearance and his or her direct examination before the court. Th e procedural body cannot forget that Art. 391 § 1 of the CCP is a special provision which allows to depart from the rule of immediacy in specifi ed circumstances, but it cannot be interpreted separately from other provisions of the Code of Criminal Procedure, in particular separately from the rules expressed in Art. 2 § 1 of the CCP, which bind the courts to, most of all, search for the truth while applying the provisions of the Code. In eff ect thereof, if the witness's testimony is considerably important to resolve the case, the court should apply Art. 391 § 1 of the CCP without prior exhaustion of the possibilities of examining the witness before the court, that is without acknowledging that there do occur insurmountable obstacles to satisfy the rule of immediacy and adversarial proceedings. Only then the witness's testimony may be read aloud within the appropriate scope regardless of its importance to the proceedings, even without the consent of the parties 10 . It certainly is not possible if the witness's residence abroad is connected with a temporary stay, visit, trip, or holiday, etc.
11 Th en, it is not possible to acknowledge that there indeed occurred insurmountable obstacles to satisfy the rule of immediacy
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. Nevertheless, each time the court decides about the disclosure of the minutes of the examination when the witness is absent in a hearing, it should consider a directive of hearing the case in a reasonable time (Art. 2 § 1 point 4 of the CCP) while respecting the victim's legally protected interests and his or her dignity
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. Due to this, it is accurate to claim that the Procedural Act does not make a possibility of reading aloud a testimony under Art. 391 § 1 of the CCP dependent on an ineff ective attempt to summon the witness to a hearing but rationality of undertaking such activities aimed at a direct examination of the witness by the court appears quite obvious 14 .
3. Th e Procedural Act does not make a possibility of reading aloud a testimony under Art. 391 § 1 of the CCP dependent on an ineff ective attempt to summon the witness to a hearing but rationality of undertaking such activities aimed at a direct examination of the witness by the court appears quite obvious, particularly if we consider the need to respect directives composing the rule of immediacy. It undeniably refers to the situation when, e.g., the place of the witness's residence abroad is known, a distance from this place to the court's building does not exceed comparable distances within the country while it results from other evidence that the witness travels from the place of residence to Poland without greater limitations 15 . Furthermore, we cannot forget that even from the moment of enacting the provision of Art. 391 § 1 of the CCP in its current reading, since Poland joined the European Union and Schengen Area, a reference point for the term "s/he resides abroad" has changed with regard to individuals residing in the EU countries. Movement of people within the Schengen Area is undeniably easier.
Finally, the right ensuing from Art. 391 § 1 of the CCP cannot be considered separately from a more and more elaborate sphere of cooperation between judicial bodies of the EU countries regulated by treaties and conventions. It allows, among others, online examination of witnesses with the use of telecommunication devices assuring transmission of both sound and image in real time. In particular, such a possibility exists with regard to the examination of a witness and expert witness under Art. 17 . In both cases, hearing by video conference does not deprive a hearing of the features of immediate hearing of evidence before the court.
